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1 Introduction
What determines the incidence of informality? The answer clearly depends on how one defines
informality. Within the development literature there are two different perspectives on how one defines
informality, each focusing on causality going from government regulations to informality as a market
response (Schneider and Enste 2000, Perry et. al. 2007).
The first perspective takes informality as an involuntary state of employment in a segmented
labor market. Good jobs in the formal sector, characterized by regulated wages and benefits, are
in high demand but short supply (Harris and Todaro 1970, Fields 1975, Chandra and Khan 1993).
Rooted in the labor market implications of informality, therefore, informality (according to this
perspective) refers to
“workers, particularly the old and young, who would prefer a job with standard labor
protections, but are unable to get one.” (Perry et. al. 2007, pp. 21.)
Associated with this perspective are measures of informality based on labor standards compli-
ance. Such measures aim at capturing the coverage of workers by mandated labor protections such as
the minimum wage (Saavedra and Chong 1999). Table 1 provides some examples of such informality
measures as: (i) the share of workers not covered by social security contributions (based on 2007
and 2008 EU-SILC), (ii) the share of workers not covered by an employment contract (based on the
European Social Survey 2008) and (iii) the share of workers not covered by social protection (OECD
2009). From Table 1, there is substantial variation across countries in the degree of informality, irre-
spective of the specific measure used. If one focuses on measure (iii) which gives the share of workers
not covered by social protection, then informality characterizes close to or more than 50% of workers
in nearly all the countries for which this measure is available.
A second perspective takes informality as a voluntary firm-level response to evade taxes and
other costly regulations (De Soto 1989, Friedman et al. 2000, Djankov et al. 2002, Loayza, Serven, and
Oviedo 2005, Schneider 2005, de Paula and Scheinkman 2010), when weak or non-existent enforcement
of taxes and other costly regulations make informal operations more lucrative than formal regulated
operations. Rooted in the public finance implications of informality, therefore, informality (according
to this perspective) refers to
“firms and individuals avoiding taxation or other mandated regulations because everybody
else does, and because enforcement is weak and uneven” (Perry et. al. 2007, pp. 22.)
Associated with this perspective are measures of informality based on tax compliance. Such
measures may result from tax audits that define the magnitude of the informal economy as the
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difference between the income declared in tax returns and the income actually found after an audit
(World Bank 2011). Table 2 provides examples of such informality measures, including measures
that capture different shades of informality even among formally registered firms: (i) the percentage
of firms expressing that a typical firm reports less than 100% of sales for tax purposes, (ii) the
percentage of firms competing against unregistered or informal firms, (iii) the percentage of firms
formally registered when they started operations in the country and (iv) the average number of
years firms operated without formal registration. From Table 2, there is (as in Table 1) substantial
variation across countries in the degree of informality, irrespective of the specific measure used. For
example, if one focuses on measure (i), then Liberia ranks particularly high with respondents putting
the percentage of firms which report too few sales to escape taxes as more than 97% while for Jordan
this fraction is just 13%. Moreover, measure (ii) shows a higher degree of informality for each country
than does measure (iii).
These two distinct perspectives on informality have also inspired a large subsequent literature
on theoretical modeling, as well as empirical policy analyses. In terms of theoretical modeling, the
seminal work of Fields (1975) and related subsequent studies address formal and informal labor market
consequences of formal sector wage regulations. Early studies are in the tradition of dualistic labor
market models (Fei and Ranis 1964, Harris and Todaro 1970, Doeringer and Piore 1971, Stiglitz 1974),
while recent studies relax assumptions on competitive labor markets (Basu, Chau and Kanbur 2010),
and contractual commitments (Basu, Chau and Kanbur 2011). Models of tax evasion incorporating
both an above- and an under-ground sector (Kesselman 1989, Jung, Snow and Trandel 1994) have
also been developed. These models extend the traditional tax evasion frameworks of Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) to a multi-sector setting and provide an analytical basis for
ongoing debates concerning the role of tax policy reforms on tax evasion among formal firms, as well
as the underground informal economy.
In terms of empirical policy analysis, there has been a recent surge in empirical research gen-
erating the following set of intriguing insights about how the informal economy operates in response
to labor and tax regulations:
• minimum wage non-compliance is widespread among formal sector employers, as well as informal
sector employers (Ashenfelter and Smith 1979, Lemos 2004, 2006, Gindling and Terrell 1995,
2006, Maloney and Nunez 2004);
• tax evasion is widespread among formal sector firms, as well as informal sector firms (Feige
1989, Tanzi 1980, 1999, Cowell 1990, Cobham 2005, Fuest and Riedel 2009);
• subminimum wages and informal employment can exhibit a diverse set of responses to minimum
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wage hikes (Card and Krueger 1995, Lemos 2004, Baanante 2004, Strobl and Walsh 2001);
• tax policy reforms can have a significant impact on the incidence of informality in an economy
(Gabrielli, Galvao and Montes-Rojas 2011, Jonasson 2001, Koettl 2011, Slonimczyk 2011).
Given the above, the point of departure of this paper from existing literature is to provide a
theoretical framework better equipped at capturing the realities that (i) both formal and informal
firms may fail to comply with labor and tax regulations, while (ii) labor and tax regulations jointly
determine the differing shades of informal firm like behavior through minimum wage non-compliance
and tax evasion.
We posit a framework wherein formal establishments are subject to three sets of costs not
borne by informal firms. With respect to wage regulation, formal establishments are expected to pay
workers at least a minimum wage. With respect to tax regulations, formal establishments are obliged
to pay authorities a tax on profits earned, and to withhold taxes on wage income to be transferred
directly to authorities. With respect to the cost of entry, formal firms incur a cost of registration.
In contrast, informal establishments and informal workers are free from both the state mandated
regulation on wages and the need to pay taxes on profits or wages while operating in an environment
where entry and exit is cost-free.
Firms must choose between operating in the formal or the informal sector, while workers seek
wage protection in the formal sector (subject to wage income tax) using the informal wage as a
reservation wage. Within this context, we examine three items of interest: (i) tax evasion via the
misreporting of wage cost by formal firms, (ii) minimum wage non-compliance via the underpayment
of the state mandated minimum wage among formal firms, and (iii) the incidence of informality as
establishments choose to operate either in the formal or the informal sector.
In doing so, the contributions of this paper are the following. First, and to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first attempt at examining minimum wage non-compliance by simultaneously
scrutinizing the endogenous determinants of the reported wage cost of a formal employer and the
actual take-home wage of a formal employee, in a setting where tax and minimum wage enforcement
are both imperfect. A clear distinction between the two can offer important insights into empirical
studies of wage distributions based either on firm-reported data on wage costs, or on labor force
surveys from which records of actual take home wage can be ascertained. In particular, it is by
now well-known that empirical studies of wage distributions in developing countries exhibit spikes
at or around the minimum wage, despite lax enforcement. Our analysis provides the rationale for
researchers to go one step deeper, to distinguish between reported wage distribution and actual wage
distribution. For example, is the spike purely a reflection of a lip-service reporting of firm-level wage
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cost? Or is the true take home wage distribution of formal employee also marked by a spike at or
around the minimum wage despite lax enforcement?
Second, the proposed model allows for a side-by-side comparison of tax compliance among
formal employers, minimum wage compliance among formal employers, and the incidence of infor-
mality where neither tax regulations nor minimum wage regulations are fully respected. This is of
particular importance for, in practice, tax enforcement in the formal sector is carried out via tax
audits and random checks by tax authorities (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 1998), while minimum
wage enforcement in the formal sector is carried out independently by labor inspectors (Weil 2004).
An understanding of how tax enforcement directly impacts tax evasion, alters minimum wage non-
compliance, and changes the overall incidence of informality is clearly key to effective formation of
tax and wage enforcement policies.1
Third, our model provides a setting in which the potential direct and cross-cutting impacts of
wage and tax policies on various measures of informality can be better understood. For example,
how does a minimum wage hike impact the extent of tax evasion by formal firms, and the number
of firms that completely do away with the obligation to pay taxes as they exit the formal sector? In
this regard, we present a list of testable hypotheses that complement a series of papers dedicated to
understanding minimum wage non-compliance (Ashenfelter and Smith 1979, Basu, Chau and Kanbur
2010) without the additional complication of tax evasion. Next, how does a tax reform impact the
extent of minimum wage compliance by formal firms, and the number of firms that completely evade
the obligation to pay a minimum wage by exiting to the informal sector? In this latter regard, we
provide results that will substantially extend those of an earlier literature on tax evasion, for example,
in which one or both of the following are absent: the minimum wage mandate, and the existence of
an informal sector where tax obligations and minimum wage protection do not apply (Yaniv 1988,
1990, Tonin 2011).
The model we posit allows us to identify six distinctive potential regimes of labor market
equilibria and as many potential sets of comparative statics responses of labor market outcomes with
respect to changes in minimum wage and tax policies, depending on the pairing of minimum wage
and worker productivity, as well as the nature of the tax and minimum wage policies. These embody
1The literature on the determinants, duration, and separation probability of formal employment, informal employ-
ment, and unemployment is a much better researched topic. On the duration, separation probabilities, and entry
probabilities of formal and informal employment in Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, see Bosch and Maloney (2011).
Almeida and Carneiro (2011) studies the impact of labor standards enforcement on mandated benefits on formal em-
ployment, informal employment and unemployment in Brazil. Chong, Galdo, Saavedra (2008) considers the role of labor
legislations and worker productivity on the incidence of informality in Peru. Fugazza and Jacques (2004) theoretically
examines the role of unemployment benefits, minimum wage, taxation and audits on labor allocation in a matching
model. In a search theoretic setup, Albrecht, Navaroo and Vroman (2009) examines the role of labor market policy on
the incidence of informality and the distribution of wages across formal-sector workers.
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combinations of cases where in equilibrium, (i) reported employer wage payment to government
tax authorities exactly comply with, or exceed the official minimum wage, coupled with (ii) actual
employer wage payment to workers that does not comply, complies exactly, or over-complies with the
minimum wage law. In this paper, we make a complete characterization of the six classes of labor
market equilibria and the corresponding comparative statics responses.
To pick one case in point, for minimum wages that are sufficiently high relative to worker
productivity, strictly positive but imperfect tax enforcement, and no minimum wage enforcement, all
employers report the exact payment of the minimum wage as required by law, but in truth evade
taxes as the reported wage cost is an over-statement of wage that workers take home. Since tax
evasion (or, wage understatement) is synonymous with minimum wage non-compliance (or, paying
less than the reported minimum wage) here, the gap between the minimum wage and the actual
wage is determined only by the strength of tax enforcement in place. Consequently, at constant tax
enforcement, raising the minimum wage raises the reported wage as well as the actual wage dollar for
dollar even in the complete absence of directly minimum wage enforcement, leaving the gap between
the two constant. This suggests intriguingly that even when there is no minimum wage enforcement,
the observed reported wage distribution exhibits a spike at the minimum wage, while the actual wage
payment also exhibits a spike at a wage relative to the official minimum wage determined by the
strength of tax enforcement that is in place.
Making use of the rich array of possible equilibrium outcomes and comparative statics responses
characterized here, we draw three broad set of conclusions illustrating the direct and cross-cutting
effects of four policy instruments – the tax rate on profit, the tax rate on personal income, the
minimum wage, and the strength of tax enforcement – respectively on informal employment, tax
evasion and minimum wage compliance. Specifically, we find that across all regimes of interest, and
regardless of the size of the minimum wage relative to labor productivity, informal sector employment
is weakly increasing in the four policy instruments. These follow directly from the weakly decreasing
relationships between formal sector profit and respectively the two tax rates, the minimum wage, and
the strength of tax enforcement, and the resulting weakly negative impact these policies have on job
creation in the formal sector.
Contrasting the uniformity in the direction of informal employment response to the four policies,
we find that the effectiveness of the four policies in combatting tax evasion differ sharply, depending
critically on the height of the minimum wage relative to worker productivity. Suppose that the
minimum wage is sufficiently low that in fact employers report a wage cost that exceeds the official
minimum wage. Tax evasion here purely reflects employers’ incentive to take full advantage of the
gap between the profit tax and the personal income tax, adjusted for the strength of tax enforcement,
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to maximize post tax profits by under-reporting wage cost. Thus, raising the profit tax stimulates
tax evasion, while raising the personal income tax, or the strength of tax enforcement discourages
it. However, if the minimum wage is sufficiently high, we find that profit maximizing employers no
longer report over-compliance with the minimum wage, but rather they maximize profits by reporting
the exact payment of the minimum wage. The distance between this reported wage and the actual
take home wage – the extent of tax evasion – naturally depends only on the strength of the tax
enforcement in place. Thus, in sharp contrast to the case with low minimum wages, tax evasion here
is fully independent of the two tax rates, and strictly decreasing in the strength of tax enforcement.
The effectiveness of the four policies in combatting minimum wage non-compliance is likewise
critically dependent on the height of the minimum wage. With a sufficiently high minimum wage,
as discussed the reported wage coincides with the minimum wage. As such, tax evasion becomes
synonymous with minimum wage non-compliance. Since tax evasion depends only on the strength of
tax enforcement in this case as discussed above, the same is true of minimum wage non-compliance. If,
however, the minimum wage is sufficiently low, employers report over-compliance with the minimum
wage. This severs the direct link between tax evasion and minimum wage non-compliance. Indeed,
while tax evasion depends critically on the profit tax rate and the strength of tax enforcement,
minimum wage compliance is wholly independent of these considerations.
The model concludes with a formulation of two sets of optimal wage and tax policies, respec-
tively with the stated objective of poverty minimization, and tax revenue maximization, taking as
given the strength of minimum wage and tax enforcement. These two objectives echo popular concerns
regarding the consequences of runaway expansion of the informal sector. We show that the existence
of a poverty alleviating minimum wage depends critically, among other things, on the strength of the
tax enforcement regime, when minimum wage enforcement is lax. Meanwhile, we show that a flat tax
reform can be justified, requiring the harmonization of the tax on profits and tax on wage income,
on the grounds of tax revenue maximization, so long as corresponding adjustments in the minimum
wage can be made as well.
The plan of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, the decision problem of a formal sector
employer with respect to what wage to report to tax authorities, what actual wage to pay workers,
and whether or not to exit to the informal sector will be established. In Section 3, the implied
determinants of equilibrium tax evasion, minimum wage non-compliance, and incidence of informality
will be examined. In Section 4, we provide an analysis of the optimal policy for poverty alleviation
for a given poverty line, and finally in section 5, we provide an analysis of the optimal policy for tax
revenue maximization. Section 6 concludes with suggestions for a number of directions for future
research.
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2 The Model
Workers
We consider a labor market with a large pool of workers (N¯). Each worker is distinguished by his
skill level, a ≥ 0, and the subset of skill type a workers is given exogenously by N(a). Two states of
employment are available: informal sector employment, and formal sector employment. The informal
sector is a free-entry sector: any worker that desires a job can find one there, and any worker that
desires to exit the sector can do so at will.2 By contrast, we denote the endogenous likelihood that a
skill type a worker receives a formal sector job offer as α(a).
Formal sector workers are obligated to pay personal income tax, but informal sector workers
are not. The corresponding formal and informal sector take-home earnings, net of any personal in-
come tax withheld by employers in the formal sector tf (a), will be denoted as ωf (a) − tf (a) and
ωi(a) respectively. Conditional on receiving a formal sector job offer, a skill type a worker compares
ωf (a) − tf (a) with the reservation benchmark ωi(a), and selects the best of the two. Otherwise,
without a formal job offer, the worker earns ωi(a) in the informal sector.
Formal Employers
Let there be an endogenous M(a) number of employers in search of skill type a workers in the formal
sector. A match between an employer and a skill type a worker in the formal sector generates net
output a.3 Formal employers are furthermore subject to a minimum wage legislation and a tax on
profits, unlike informal sector employers who are free from these obligations. For any formal sector
employer with a contracted worker, expected profit is given by the value of net output a net of wage
cost ωf (a), adjusted for any required tax withholdings of labor earnings tf (a), applicable taxes T (a)
on wages and profits, and expected penalties associated with the discovery of tax evasion Ep(a), if
any:
pif (a) = a− [ωf (a)− tf (a)]− T (a)− Ep(a). (1)
Matching in the Formal Sector
The meeting of formal sector job seekers and formal sector employers is characterized by the presence
of match friction in the formal labor market. Specifically, let Φ(M(a), N(a)) = θM(a)β N(a)1−β, β ∈
[0, 1] denote a matching technology that gives the number of matches between employers and workers,
given M(a) number of formal employers with a job offer no worse than an informal job, and N(a)
2Though informal employment is modeled as wage employment here, the results of the our analysis will remain
unchanged if informal self-employment is considered instead, when each self-employed informal sector worker receives a
skill specific take home income of ωi(a).
3Net output a is taken to account for any other costs of production, associated with capital use for example, per
worker hired.
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number of formal sector job seekers. As stated, Φ(·) is increasing in both arguments, and homo-
geneous of degree one in (M(a), N(a)). The associated likelihood that an individual worker seeking
employment is matched with a formal sector offer is
α(a) =
Φ(M(a), N(a))
N(a)
(2)
while the likelihood that an employer seeking a worker is matched with one is
αe(a) =
Φ(M(a), N(a))
M(a)
. (3)
Becoming a Formal Employer
Denote the cost associated with registering a formal sector firm plus any additional cost required to
raise start-up capital, for example, as cf . Expected formal sector profit is thus:
Epif (a) = αe(a)pif (a)− cf . (4)
We now turn to employers in the informal sector. Many studies have argued that without formal
registration, and without the ability to raise the startup capital that a formally registered firm is able
to, a productivity gap exists between formal and informal firms (Loayza 1996, Djankov et al. 2003,
Straub 2005, Amaral and Quintin 2006). We follow this line of argument and take the productivity
of a worker in the informal sector to be only a fraction wi < 1 of his full productivity.
With perfect competition and free-entry on both the supply and demand sides of the informal
labor market, expected profits in the informal sector Epii(a) are driven to zero,
Epii(a) = 0, (5)
while the informal wage is given by the marginal value of product of laborers there, ωi(a) = wia.
Armed with (1), (4) and (5), an employer makes a decision between operating in the formal
and the informal sector by comparing Epif (a) and Epii(a). In equilibrium, employers are indifferent
between the two sectors whenever
Epif (a) = Epii(a) ⇔ αe(a)pif (a)− cf = 0.
By definition of the likelihood of a match with a worker αe(a) in (3), and the likelihood of formal job
arrival facing workers α(a) in (2),
αe(a) =
cf
pif (a)
, and α(a) = θ1/(1−β)
(
pif (a)
cf
)β/(1−β)
. (6)
It follows from (6) that in order to ascertain the likelihood of equilibrium formal sector employment,
α(a), or that of equilibrium informal sector employment, 1−α(a), information about after-tax profits
of employers of skill type a workers, pif (a), is paramount. We turn to a detailed analysis of pif (a)
now.
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2.1 Tax Evasion, Minimum Wage, and Expected Formal Profits
The decision problem of a formal employer is two-fold: choose a wage r(a) to be reported to tax
authorities based on which the formal employer’s tax liability will be assessed, and an actual wage
ωf (a) to be paid to workers that need not be equal to r(a). Whenever r(a) > ωf (a), we say that there
is over-reporting of wage cost. Otherwise, if r(a) < ωf (a), we say that wage cost is under-reported.
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Let τω < 1 denote the personal income tax rate. Formal employers are required to withhold
taxes on labor income and transfer them directly to tax authorities. Thus, an employer’s choice
of reported wage cost r(a) will have a direct bearing on the amount of tax withholdings from labor
income, for tax withholding is given simply by the personal income tax rate multiplied by the reported
wage r(a):
tf (a) = τωr(a). (7)
To ensure that formal sector employment is viable, in that the post-tax income of a formal sector
worker can exceed that of an informal sector worker, we work with parameter values such that a(1−τω)
exceeds wia, or 1 − τω − wi > 0, requiring effectively that the post-tax net output that each formal
worker can generate exceeds the informal sector counterpart.
Denote τpi < 1 as the profit tax rate. For a formal employer, the total amount of taxes due to
tax authorities, calculated based on reported wage cost r(a), is given by τpi times pre-tax reported
profit (min{0, a− r(a)}), plus personal income taxes withheld (τωr(a)):
T (a) = τpi min{0, a− r(a)}+ τωr(a) (8)
where τpi min{0, a−r(a)} ≥ 0 indicates a tax policy that does not provide subsidies to employers who
reportedly earn negative pre-tax profits.
Henceforth, let φ(a) denote the likelihood of a tax audit. With probability 1−φ(a), the formal
employer is not audited, and profit is simply given by net output a, net of wage cost adjusted for
personal income taxes withheld (ωf (a)− τωr(a)), and net of profit tax due to authorities calculated
based on reported wage cost (τpi min{0, a− r(a)}+ τωr(a)):
a− ωf (a)− τpi min{0, a− r(a)}.
As may be expected, given the true wage cost ωf (a), formal employer profit rises with the reported
wage r(a) since r(a) is inversely related to a formal employer’s calculated tax liability τpi min{0, a−
r(a)}.
4We focus here exclusively on the possibility of tax evasion based on the mis-reporting of costs, and assume that
revenue a is verifiable upon audit. Other methods of tax evasion clearly exist. For example, in a setting where a firm
employs multiple workers, under-reporting the number of workers is another interesting possibility. We thank a referee
for pointing this out, and leave the issue for future research.
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With probability φ(a), the formal employer is audited. This leads to the discovery of the
extent of mis-reported profits, if any. Let p(a) denote the penalty associated with the discovery of
mis-reported profits equaling |[a−ωf (a)]− [a−r(a)]| = |r(a)−ωf (a)|, and of mis-reported wage cost,
also equal to |r(a) − ωf (a)|. Total penalty to be imposed on a tax evading employer, if discovered,
will given by p¯ multiplied by the extent of mis-reporting:
p(a) = p¯|r(a)− ωf (a)|.
p¯ parameterizes the severity of the penalty associated with each dollar of mis-reported wages and
profits |r(a) − ωf (a)|. Throughout we will assume that p¯ ≥ 1 so employers must at least pay back
to tax authorities that amount which is mis-reported when discovered. In the event of a tax audit,
therefore, formal employer profit must now account for the penalty cost p(a), and is given by:
a− ωf (a)− τpi min{0, a− r(a)} − p(a)
= a− ωf (a)− τpi min{0, a− r(a)} − p¯|r(a)− ωf (a)|.
We assume in what follows that the likelihood of a tax audit φ(a) is determined by the likelihood
that a tax filing is red-flagged. We also assume that the criteria chosen by tax authorities to red-flag
a tax filing are relevant, in the sense that the likelihood assigned to red-flag a tax filing rises with the
extent of actual tax mis-reporting, |(r(a)−ωf (a))|. These are plausible assumptions. For example, the
Internal Revenue Service in the United States formulates and implements a “discriminant function”
on each tax return. The results inform the construction of a “DIF score”, which is used to determine
the likelihood of tax audit. According to Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998), over half of the
tax audit selections in the United States are based at least in part on this score, and average tax
assessments based on selections from the DIF score and other special examination initiatives are
systematically higher than tax assessments generated by random audits.5 In view of these evidence,
we assume henceforth that the likelihood of a tax audit is increasing in the extent of tax mis-reporting,
and specifically,
φ(a) ≡ φ¯|r(a)− ωf (a)|.
φ¯ parameterizes the frequency of tax audits, for given mis-reporting of true tax liability |r(a)−ωf (a)|.6
5In Danziger (2010) which studies the issue of minimum wage non-compliance, the probability of detection is taken
to be strictly increasing in the number of workers hired, and independent of the extent of the minimum wage violation.
In our setup where each employer hires one worker, the question of the endogeneity of inspection likelihood does not
arise. As another alternative, φ(a) is a constant with random auditing. It can be easily verified that regardless of worker
productivity, a corner solution applies – no employer ever evade taxes, or all employers evade taxes to the maximum
extent possible. We thank two anonymous referees for pointing out these possibilities.
6Given this assumption on φ(a), we will check in what follows that upon substituting for the equilibrium employer
choice of tax evasion |r∗(a) − ω∗f (a)|, where an asterisk denotes equilibrium values, the implied equilibrium likelihood
of a tax audit φ(a) = φ¯|r∗(a)− ω∗f (a)| is a fraction in the [0, 1] interval.
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It follows that expected formal employer profit is:
pif (a) = (1− φ(a))[a− ωf (a)− τpi min{0, a− r(a)}]
+φ(a)[a− ωf (a)− τpi min{0, a− r(a)} − p¯(r(a)− ωf (a))]
= a− [ωf (a) + τpi min{0, a− r(a)}]− φ¯p¯(r(a)− ωf (a))2. (9)
where the sum ωf (a) + τpi min{0, a − r(a)} gives the sum of wage cost net of taxes withheld and
applicable taxes to be transferred to tax authorities [ωf (a)− τωr(a)] + [τpi min{0, a− r(a)}+ τωr(a)]
as shown in (1), and the expected penalty Ep(a) in (1) is given by φ¯p¯(r(a)− ωf (a))2.
We are now in a position to formally examine the decision problem of a formal employer. In
choosing ωf (a) and r(a) to maximize profits pif (a), we note that any formal employer faces two types
of constraints:
Participation Constraint
The first constraint that formal employers must take note of accounts for workers’ option to seek
employment in the informal sector at any time. Thus, to attract workers, a formal job offer must
be no worse than an informal job offer. Equivalently, the take home wage of a formal sector worker
accounting appropriately for taxes withheld must be no less than the informal sector wage ωi(a) = wia
from (5). Furthermore, since taxes withheld is given by the tax rate τω times reported wage cost, the
participation constraint is:
ωf (a)− tf (a) ≥ wia, ⇔ ωf (a)− τω(a)r(a) ≥ wia. (10)
Minimum Wage Constraint
The second constraint that formal employers must also take note of accounts for the minimum wage
legislation. In our context where actual and reported wages can differ, the minimum wage constraint
requires that the employer must report at least the minimum wage as their per worker wage cost:
r(a) ≥ w¯. (11)
A failure to do so is tantamount to a wilful disregard of the minimum wage legislation, and is taken
to trigger an immediate audit and fines, large enough to obligate compliance with the reporting
constraint.7 Beyond this requirement that constrains employers’ reporting of wage cost, we focus in
7Of course, reporting the payment of the minimum wage does not guarantee the actual payment of such a wage.
Ashenfelter and Smith (1979), for example, touches on the strategy of issuing a bonafide paycheck. Employers issue a
pay check for the amount requirement by the minimum wage, and in exchange, extracts some value of the paycheck from
workers. By contrast, Saget (2008) points out that there are countries in which payment of the minimum is optional
rather than compulsory. This is the case in Indonesia for example where the minimum wage legislation lays out clearly
exceptions that can be made for employers who are not able to pay the minimum wage. In our paper, we focus our
analysis the case where the payment of the minimum wage is compulsory by law, and nonpayment of the minimum
wage is illegal. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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this paper on a government that completely turns a blind eye to the possibility of minimum wage
non-compliance, among employers that reportedly pay the minimum wage. We do so to scrutinize
the potential link between the frequency of tax audits and minimum wage compliance even in the
complete absence of minimum wage enforcement, and also to account for the reality that minimum
wage enforcement is far less than perfect in both developed and developing countries (Ashenfelter
and Smith (1979), Basu, Chau and Kanbur (2009)).8
A number of observations are in order before we proceed any further. First, an employer’s
choice of ωf (a) and r(a) determines first and foremost the extent of tax evasion per worker employed
as given by the difference:
|r(a)− ωf (a)|.
A priori, it is not clear at all whether tax evasion should come in the form of over-reporting or
under-reporting of wages. For one thing, we know from the definition of pif (a) in (9) that every
dollar increase in reported wage cost raises employer profits by τpi for given ωf (a). But meanwhile,
raising r(a) decreases the take home income of formal sector workers. If the participation constraint
in (10) binds, every dollar increase in reported wage cost r(a) would require a corresponding increase
in actual wage cost by at least τω dollars. These suggest that two sets of considerations should be
expected to be in play in the employer’s decision problem: (i) whether the participation constraint
binds, and (ii) whether a tax gap exists between the profit τpi and the personal income tax rates τω.
Second, an employer’s choice of ωf (a) and r(a) also determines the extent of minimum wage
non-compliance. We gauge this non-compliance by evaluating the difference between the post-tax
wage income of a minimum wage worker, w¯(1− τω), and the actual wage income of the same worker
net of taxes withheld and calculated based on the reported wage, ωf (a)− τωr(a):
w¯(1− τω)− [ωf (a)− τωr(a)]. (12)
If strictly positive, (12) gives the extent of minimum wage non-compliance. If strictly negative, there
is over-compliance with the minimum wage legislation. Finally, if (12) is equal to zero, formal sector
workers receive exactly the minimum wage net of any government mandated personal income tax
evaluated based on the minimum wage as their take home earning. There are three open questions
here, each requiring an in-depth analysis: (i) Are there systematic differences between reported wages
r(a) and actual take home wages ωf (a)−τωr(a) across workers of differing skill levels? In other words,
how should reported minimum wage compliance be expected to compare with actual minimum wage
compliance? (ii) How does the extent of minimum wage non-compliance respond to a hike in the
8A full account of a formal employer’s decision problem in the presence of tax and minimum wage enforcement would
require a full-length analysis that is beyond the scope of the current study. We leave this for future research.
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minimum wage when minimum wage enforcement is lax, but tax audit is carried out in regular
frequency? (iii) What is the nature, if any, of the cross-cutting influence that changes in the tax rates
may have on minimum wage non-compliance, or that changes in the minimum wage may have on the
extent of tax evasion?
As a third observation, note that economy-wide tax evasion and minimum wage compliance
depend not just on what formal sector employers do, but on the incidence of informal sector employ-
ment as well, since informal employers do not pay taxes, nor do they comply with the minimum wage
law. From (6), the incidence of informality, as measured by the fraction of informal sector workers
among skill type a workers, is:
1− α(a) = 1− θ1/(1−β)
(
pif (a)
cf
)β/(1−β)
. (13)
Thus, in order to ascertain the effectiveness of a minimum wage policy w¯ in raising labor earnings
beyond wia, and the effectiveness of the tax policy {τpi, τω, φ¯p¯} in collecting tax revenue, the possibility
that any policy shock can lead to a potential exodus of formal sector employers to the informal sector
must be accounted for.
With these three considerations in mind, the ensuing analysis will focus on the role of four policy
measures (w¯, τpi, τω, φ¯p¯) on (i) tax evasion, (ii) minimum wage non-compliance and (iii) incidence of
informality as defined above. Later on in Section 4, the optimal choice of minimum wage and tax
policies to fulfill two distinctive goals: to maximize tax revenue, and to minimize the incidence of
poverty, will be formally defined and examined.
3 Tax Evasion, Minimum Wage Non-compliance and Incidence of
Informality
We undertake here an analysis of tax evasion, minimum wage non-compliance and the corresponding
incidence of informality for the case where the minimum wage is less than the net output per worker
in the formal sector: a > w¯. The complementary case of a < w¯ would of course trivially generate
a complete exodus of formal sector employers to the informal sector if the minimum wage law is
enforced. It can be demonstrated that the qualitative findings in what follows remain unchanged
even in the imperfect enforcement case, and the proof is available upon request.
From (9), the decision problem of the employer is:
max
ωf ,r
a− ωf − τpi min{a− r, 0} − φ¯p¯(r − ωf )2 (14)
subject to the participation constraint ωf ≥ wia + τωr, and the minimum wage constraint r ≥ w¯.
Denote the solutions to (14) with an asterisk, there are six possible regimes to consider: with strictly
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positive reported profits a − r∗(a) > 0, (I) only the participation constraint is strictly binding, (II)
only the minimum wage constraint is strictly binding and (III) both constraints are binding.9 The
remaining three possible cases apply when reported profit a−r∗(a) is non-positive, with (IV) only the
participation constraint is strictly binding, (V) only the minimum wage constraint is strictly binding
and (VI) both constraints are binding.
3.1 Positive Reported Profits
We begin with the case of positive reported profits, and consider each of the three regimes (I) - (III)
alluded to above:
I. Binding Participation Constraint
For an employer who reports positive pre-tax profit, max{a− r, 0} = a− r, and as such from (14) his
decision problem is:
max
ωf ,r
a− ωf − τpi(a− r)− φ¯p¯(r − ωf )2.
Maximizing the above subject to a binding participation constraint, ωf − τωr = wia the profit
maximizing choices of a formal employer are:10
r∗(a) =
wia+ δ
1− τω , ω
∗
f (a) =
wia+ δτω
1− τω , ω
∗
f (a)− r∗(a)τω = wia, (15)
where δ ≡ (τpi − τω)/[2φ¯p¯(1 − τω)]. Intuitively, with the participation constraint strictly binding,
formal sector workers take home their reservation wage ω∗f (a) − τωr∗(a) = wia, and any increase
in formal sector income tax τωr
∗(a) must be compensated by a corresponding increase in pre-tax
wage ω∗f (a). In addition, from (15), the formal employer over-reports wage cost r
∗(a) > ω∗f (a), or
equivalently δ > 0, if and only if the profit tax rate τpi exceeds the personal income tax τω, and
under-reports wage cost r∗(a) < ω∗f (a) otherwise when τpi is less than τω.
Table 3 displays separately the profit tax rates and the lowest personal income tax rates in
120 countries (World Bank 2011, PricewaterhouseCoopers 2011).11 We take the lowest personal
income tax rate as the relevant income class for minimum wage workers. As shown, in an overwhelm-
ing majority of these countries where tax data is available, the profit tax rate strictly exceeds the
9It is straightforward to verify that for any (ωf , r) pair such that neither of the two constraints bind, ωf > wia+ τωr
and r > w¯, an alternative pairing (ω′f , r
′) can be found along a binding participation constraint that raises expected
profit, a−ωf − τpi(a− r)− φ¯p¯(r−ωf )2 < a−ωf − τpi(a− r′)− φ¯p¯(r′−ω′f )2. A formal proof is relegated to Appendix A.
10In this, as well as in all of the subsequent maximization problems, it is straightforward to verify that the second
order conditions are satisfied. In addition, from (15), the implied equilibrium likelihood of a tax audit φ∗(a) = φ¯(r∗(a)−
ω∗f (a)) = 1/(2p¯) in regime I is in the interior of the [0, 1] interval since the penalty parameter p¯ is assumed to take on
values greater than or equal to unity.
11World Bank (2011) data is from 2010 survey (latest data available for 2011) and PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) is
also the latest available (accessed 2011).
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corresponding personal income tax rate. In view of this evidence, we will henceforth maintain the
assumption that τpi > τω, with the implication that formal employers will tend to over-report wage
costs. Thus, |r∗(a) − ω∗f (a)| = r∗(a) − ω∗f (a). This finding is intuitive, and consistent with Yaniv
(1990) which analyzes the case without a minimum wage and without an informal sector. In partic-
ular, since the profit tax rate exceeds the personal income tax rate, under-reporting profits confers
greater tax savings to the employer than under-reporting wage cost, when the post-tax take home
income of formal workers cannot fall below the reservation level wia.
Tax evasion, in this case, depends critically on the tax gap τpi − τω, in particular, from (15)
r∗(a)− ω∗f (a) = δ =
τpi − τω
2φ¯p¯(1− τω)
,
the larger the tax gap, the larger will be the equilibrium tax evasion. Furthermore, the frequency of
tax auditing as parameterized by φ¯, and the penalty associated with discovered tax evasion p¯, both
mitigate against employer incentives to evade taxes. Small changes in the minimum wage do not
alter the tax evasion calculation based purely on the tax gap and tax enforcement, and have thus no
impact on equilibrium tax evasion.
From (15), minimum wage non-compliance is given by:
w¯(1− τω)− (ω∗f − r∗(a)τω) = w¯(1− τω)− wia.
Clearly, formal employers of sufficiently high skilled workers, with a > w¯(1 − τω)/wi, over-comply
with the minimum wage legislation for otherwise an informal sector job will be more attractive to
workers. All other employers offer workers just enough to make a formal job attractive, though not
enough to comply with the minimum wage mandate. For those that do not comply with the minimum
wage legislation, since workers take home exactly their reservation income wia in the presence of a
binding participation constraint, the extent of minimum wage non-compliance is exactly equal to the
difference between the government mandated take home wage w¯(1−τω) and the reservation wage wia.
It follows therefore that an increase in the government mandated minimum post-tax take home wage
w¯(1− τω) stimulates minimum wage non-compliance. Meanwhile, small changes in the profit tax τpi
has no impact on this minimum wage policy induced mandate to increase wages by w¯(1− τω)−wia,
and thus have no impact on minimum wage non-compliance.
Now, substituting (15) into (13), and using (6), the incidence of informality 1− α∗(a) is given
by:
1− θ1/(1−β)
(
[
1− τpi
1− τω (a(1− τω − wi)) + φ¯p¯δ
2]/cf
)β/(1−β)
. (16)
Routine differentiation reveals that 1 − α∗(a) is increasing in both tax rates, and in the frequency
and penalty associated with tax audits φ¯ and p¯ if and only if the employer mis-reports the true wage
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cost, or if and only if τpi 6= τω. Again since workers are paid their reservation wage, formal employer
profits are in fact independent of the minimum wage w¯. This is true for employers of highly skilled
workers a > w¯(1− τω)/wi who over-comply with the minimum wage law, as well as those who do not
comply (a < w¯(1− τω)/wi).
We now check the conditions under which our starting premises are true: that (i) the partic-
ipation constraint is the only binding constraint, and that (ii) reported pre-tax profit a − r∗(a) is
strictly positive. From (15), the participation constraint is the only binding constraint if and only if
formal employers report a wage greater than the minimum wage r∗(a) > w¯. From (15), this occurs if
and only if the minimum wage is sufficiently small relative to the productivity of the workers:
r∗(a) =
wia+ δ
1− τω > w¯ ⇔ w¯ <
wia+ δ
1− τω . (17)
This is illustrated in Figure 1a. To the right of the 45 degree line are all combinations of a and w¯
such that worker productivity exceeds the minimum wage. The upward sloping schedule labeled PC
furthermore divides all (a, w¯) combinations into two groups. For those (a, w¯) that lie below the PC
schedule, the inequality in (17) holds, and as such, the participation constraint is the only binding
constraint. Otherwise, for all other combinations that lie above the PC schedule, the inequality in
(17) is violated as w¯ is high enough now so that the minimum wage constraint starts to bind.
Furthermore, and also from (15), reported pre-tax profit is strictly positive if and only if
a > r∗(a), or equivalently, when worker productivity is sufficiently high:
r∗(a) =
wia+ δ
1− τω < a ⇔ a >
δ
1− τω − wi . (18)
In Figure 1a, for all employer-worker matches involving a ≥ δ/(1 − τω − wi), and all (a, w¯) to the
right of the upward sloping schedule labeled PC, formal employers maximize profits by reporting
positive profits, and by reporting a wage cost that strictly exceeds the minimum wage w¯. To the left
of a = δ1−τω−wi , worker productivity is too small and formal employer maximize profits by reporting
non-positive profits. We will return to this case in the sequel.
Summarizing, with high output per worker, a > δ/(1 − τω − wi), formal employers report
positive profits (from (18)). As long as there is a tax gap between profit and personal tax income
τpi ≥ τω, over-reporting of wage cost occurs (from (15)). The extent of this mis-reporting depends im-
portantly on the size of the tax gap, the frequency of tax audits and the associated penalty. For some
employers in this range, particularly those with sufficiently high skilled workers, this over-reporting
of wage cost occurs as they over-comply with the minimum wage legislation, and pay each worker
more than what the minimum wage legislation mandates. Other employers in the range continue to
over-report wage cost, but do not comply with the minimum wage legislation. Even accounting for
16
wage over-reporting, however, in this range with relatively high worker productivity and relatively
low minimum wage (w¯ < (wia + δ)/(1 − τω)), the participation constraint is binding, meaning that
the post-tax take-home earnings of formal sector workers is equal to the reservation wage wia (from
(17)). It follows, therefore, that in the absence of minimum wage enforcement, the minimum wage is
ineffective in the sense that the income well-being of workers in this range is in fact fully invariant to
the minimum wage, as well as the two tax rates τpi, and τω.
II. Binding Minimum Wage Constraint
Now, let us consider the case in which the minimum wage constraint is the only binding constraint.
Here, formal employers report paying the lowest wage mandated by the minimum wage legislation
at r = w¯, while at the same time offer contracted workers a post tax take home wage that strictly
exceeds their reservation wage ωf − τωr > wia, consistent with a participation constraint that is not
binding.
With this combination of r and ωf , expected formal employer profit, when only the minimum
wage constraint binds, is
max
ωf ,r
a− ωf − τpi(a− r)− φ¯p¯(r − ωf )2, s.t. r = w¯
= max
ωf
(1− τpi)a+ τpiw¯ − [ωf + φ¯p¯(w¯ − ωf )2]
The solution to the employer’s decision problem when only the minimum wage constraint is
binding is thus:12
r∗(a) = w¯, ω∗f (a) = w¯ −
1
2φ¯p¯
, ω∗f (a)− r∗(a)τω = w¯(1− τω)−
1
2φ¯p¯
. (19)
As shown in (19), formal employers in this regime reports the minimum mandated wage w¯ as the
wage cost per worker. The actual pre-tax take home wage ω∗f (a) is strictly less than the reported
wage ω∗f (a) = w¯ − 1/(2φ¯p¯) < w¯. The associated tax evasion, is
r∗(a)− ω∗f (a) =
1
2φ¯p¯
.
Clearly, the higher the frequency of tax auditing φ¯ and the more severe the penalty p¯, the smaller
will be the extent of tax evasion. Interestingly, while workers are paid strictly less than the minimum
wage, their take home sub-minimum wage co-moves with the mandated minimum dollar-for-dollar.
Consequently, equilibrium tax evasion, or equivalently the difference between r∗(a) and ω∗f (a), is
strictly invariant to w¯. Furthermore, since small changes in the two tax rates (τpi, and τω) bear no
12The associated equilibrium likelihood of tax audit φ∗(a) = φ¯|r∗(a)−ω∗f (a)| = 1/(2p¯) continues to lie in the interior
of the [0, 1] interval for p¯ ≥ 1.
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impact on the severity / frequency of the penalty associated with wage under-reporting, these changes
have no impact on the extent of tax evasion either.
Turning now to minimum wage non-compliance, the difference between the mandated post tax
wage and the actual post tax wage is:
w¯(1− τω)− (ω∗f (a)− r∗(a)τω) =
1
2φ¯p¯
> 0.
Thus, minimum wage non-compliance is synonymous with tax evasion, in that both are exactly equal
to 1/(2φ¯p¯) > 0. This implies that employers in this regime do not comply with the minimum wage
legislation, and the post-tax income of formal workers is less than what the minimum wage mandate
would require. Perhaps more importantly, since the extent of wage over-reporting depends on the
strength of tax enforcement φ¯p¯ alone, the extent of minimum wage non-compliance is independent of
the size of the minimum wage, but strictly decreasing in φ¯p¯.
Substituting (19) into (9), and using (6), the incidence of informality 1− α∗(a) is:
1− θ1/(1−β) ([(1− τpi)(a− w¯) + 1/(4φ¯p¯)]/cf)β/(1−β) .
Any policy measure that decreases formal employer profits will increase the incidence of informality.
Routine differentiation reveals that these policies include increases in the minimum wage, increases
in the profit tax rate τω, and a strengthening of the tax enforcement regime φ¯p¯. Note in particular
that since the participation constraint is not binding here, small changes in the personal income tax
τω does not impact formal employers’ ability to attract workers at constant ω
∗
f (a), and the incidence
of informality is thus in fact independent of τω.
Let us now verify the starting premises in this regime: (i) the minimum wage constraint is the
only binding constraint, and (ii) reported pre-tax profit a− r∗(a) is strictly positive. From (19), the
minimum wage constraint is the only binding constraint if and only if ω∗f (a) − r∗(a)τω > wia, or if
the minimum wage is sufficiently high relative to the productivity of the workers:
w¯ >
wia+ 1/(2φ¯p¯)
1− τω . (20)
From (19), reported pre-tax profit is in fact always strictly positive in this regime upon substituting
(19) into (14),
pi∗f (a) = (1− τpi)(a− w¯) + 1/(4φ¯p¯) > 0, (21)
whenever worker productivity exceeds the minimum wage. This automatically rules out Regime V
discussed at the beginning of this section, where the minimum wage is the only binding constraint in
the presence of non-positive reported profit.
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Figure 1b illustrates. As before in Figure 1a, to the right of the 45 degree line are all combi-
nations of a and w¯ such that worker productivity exceeds the minimum wage. The upward sloping
schedule labeled MW divides all (a, w¯) combinations into two groups. For minimum wage sufficiently
high and above the MW schedule, the inequality in (20) is satisfied and hence the minimum wage
constraint is the only binding constraint. Otherwise, for relatively low minimum wage and below the
MW schedule, the inequality in (20) is violated and the participation constraint begins to bind. Using
(21), all employer worker matches (a, w¯) that lie above the MW schedule report positive profits.
Summarizing, in sharp contrast to the earlier regime where the participation constraint is the
only binding constraint when the minimum wage is low relative to the productivity of workers, the
minimum wage constraint is the only binding constraint when the minimum wage is sufficiently high
relative to the productivity of workers w¯ > (wia + 1/(2φ¯p¯))/(1 − τω) (from (20)). Also unlike the
previous regime where tax evasion depends critically on the tax policy induced tax gap τpi − τω,
while minimum wage non-compliance depends on the minimum wage policy mandated wage hike
w¯(1− τω)−wia, minimum wage non-compliance is in fact synonymous with tax evasion here in that
they are both given by the same expression that depends only on the strength of the tax enforcement
in place 1/(2φ¯p¯) (from (19)).
Thus, the stricter the tax enforcement regime, the higher will be the actual wage that formal
employers voluntarily pay, and tax enforcement becomes a means to discourage tax evasion, as well
as a means to encourage minimum wage compliance. Indeed, for all employer-worker matches in
this regime where the participation constraint is not binding, the formal sector wage accounting
appropriately for the tax on wage income, w¯τω, or w¯(1−τω)−1/(2φ¯p¯), strictly exceeds the reservation
wage wia. Since the formal take home wage ω
∗
f (a) improves with tax enforcement φ¯p¯, the formal-
informal pay gap
ω∗f (a)− r∗(a)τω − wia = w¯(1− τω)−
1
2φ¯p¯
− wia
is thus strictly increasing in the strength of tax enforcement as well. This is an important obser-
vation, to be developed further in the section to follows: even in the complete absence of minimum
wage enforcement, both the reported and the actual post tax take home wage of formal sector worker
strictly increases with a sufficiently high minimum wage satisfying (20). The hike in take home wages
from the reservation level wia in (5) to w¯(1−τω)−1/(2φ¯p¯) in (19) is subject to the implicit discipline
of the system of tax enforcement and audit in place φ¯p¯. The stricter the enforcement against tax
evasion, the steeper will be the hike in workers’ take home wage relative to the reservation level.
III. Binding Participation and Minimum Wage Constraint
Unlike in regimes I and II where the minimum wage is respectively sufficiently low, and sufficiently
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high, for minimum wage in the intermediate range, w¯ ∈ ((wia+δ)/(1−τω), (wia+1/(2φ¯p¯))/(1−τω)),
both the participation and the minimum wage constraints are binding. The two binding constraints
jointly and uniquely determine the reported and take home wages in this regime:13
r∗(a) = w¯, ω∗f (a) = wia+ w¯τω, ω
∗
f (a)− r∗(a)τω = wia. (22)
With a binding participation constraint, formal workers receive an after-tax pay that is equal to their
reservation wage wia. With a binding minimum wage constraint, employers report a wage cost that is
equal to the minimum wage. Jointly, these imply that formal employers compensate workers simply
by paying the reservation wage wia, and top off with an additional amount that compensates workers
for the personal income tax that a formal sector worker owes tax authorities w¯τω, evaluated at the
reported wage cost w¯.
The associated equilibrium tax evasion in this regime is
r∗(a)− ω∗f = w¯(1− τω)− wia > 0,
where the inequality follows since w¯ ∈ ((wia+δ)/(1−τω), (wia+1/(2φ¯p¯))/(1−τω)). Thus, employers
in this regime also over-report wage costs. In addition, with both constraints binding, equilibrium
tax evasion is simply given by the minimum wage policy mandated wage hike w¯(1 − τω) − wia.
Importantly, tax evasion is now fully independent of the frequency of tax audit φ¯ or the penalty p¯.
Small changes in the profit tax τpi has surprisingly no local impact on tax evasion either. Effectively,
in this range, the minimum wage is high enough so that reporting any wage higher than w¯ invites
too high an increase in expected penalty. Meanwhile, worker productivity is also high enough in this
range, so that simply paying workers a wage that minimizes wage plus expected penalty costs, as in
regime II above, is not sufficient to guarantee participation. Consequently, equilibrium tax evasion
reflects these considerations as employers report exactly the minimum wage, while setting the true
wage cost at a level that makes a formal job no worse than an informal job.
In terms of minimum wage non-compliance, we note that minimum wage non-compliance is
once again synonymous with tax evasion:
w¯(1− τω)− [ω∗f (a)− r∗(a)τω] = w¯(1− τω)− wia > 0
though the extent of minimum wage non-compliance is now independent of the strength of tax en-
forcement, unlike regime II. Taken together, both equilibrium tax evasion and equilibrium minimum
non-compliance strictly increases with the mandated post-tax income w¯(1− τω). However, minimum
13The associated equilibrium likelihood of tax audit φ∗(a) = φ¯|r∗(a)−ω∗f (a)| = φ¯[w¯(1−τω)−wia] ∈ ((τpi−τω)/(2p¯(1−
τω)), 1/(2p¯)) lies in the interior of the [0, 1] interval for w¯ ∈ ((wia+ δ)/(1− τω), (wia+1/(2φ¯p¯))/(1− τω)) in this regime,
and p¯ ≥ 1.
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wage non-compliance can be expected to decrease with work productivity a, and thus the reservation
wage wia.
Now, the incidence of informality 1− α∗(a) is:
1− θ1/(1−β) (pi∗f (a)/cf)β/(1−β) ,
where
pi∗f (a) = (1− τpi)(a− w¯) +
1
4φ¯p¯
− φ¯p¯
(
1
2φ¯p¯
− [w¯(1− τω)− wia]
)2
> 0. (23)
It is straightforward to verify that pi∗f (a) is strictly decreasing in all three policies τpi, τω and w¯ in this
range. Consequently, the incidence of informality is accordingly strictly increasing whenever either
one of the two tax rates, or when the minimum wage rises.
To close this section, let us check that reported pre-tax profit a − r∗(a) is strictly positive in
this regime as well. From (23) above, pi∗f (a) is always strictly positive. This automatically rules out
Regime VI, where both constraints are binding in the presence of non-positive reported profit.
Figure 1c illustrates the (a, w¯) combinations that come under this regime. As shown, all (a, w¯)
combinations to the right of the 45 degree line, and in between the PC and MW schedules belong
this regime.
To summarize, for intermediate levels of the minimum wage, both the participation constraint
and the minimum wage constraint are binding. While employers continue to under-report wage cost
from (22), the reported wage cost is bounded below by w¯ here, and workers’ post tax take home
wage is bounded below by the reservation wage. Consequently, tax evasion and minimum wage non-
compliance are once again synonymous, though this value is now equal to the extent to which the
government mandated post tax wage w¯(1 − τω) exceeds workers’ reservation wage wia. In sharp
contrast to regime II, where employers also report the minimum wage as the wage cost, the strength
of tax policy enforcement no longer play a role in determining employers’ compliance to tax and
minimum wage laws (from (22)). Similarly, the profit tax rate has no impact on equilibrium tax
evasion or minimum wage non-compliance (also from (22)).
3.2 Zero Reported Profits
Since regimes V and VI have both been ruled out in the preceding paragraphs, a final regime to
consider here involves regime IV. This has been shown to be a real possibility in equilibrium for the
case where the participation constraint is the only binding constraint, and specifically when worker
productivity is lower than a threshold:
a <
δ
1− τω − wi
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as shown in (18).
IV. Binding Participation Constraint
When reported profit is non-positive r ≥ a, and when the participation constraint is the only binding
constraint, formal employers’ decision problem is as follows:
max
ωf ,r
a− ωf − φ¯p¯(r − ωf )2, s.t. r ≥ a, ωf − rτω = wia
= max
r
a− wia− rτω − φ¯p¯(r(1− τω)− wia)2, s.t. r ≥ a.
As shown, expected profit is strictly decreasing in r. Intuitively, since formal employers are no longer
subject to profit tax upon reporting non-positive profit, further raising the reported wage cost r will
only raise the expected penalty associated with the mis-reporting of profit φ¯p¯(r(1− τω)−wia)2, with
otherwise no further beneficial impact on profits. The solutions to the employer’s problem in this
case involves setting14
r∗(a) = a, ω∗f (a) = a(wi + τω), ω
∗
f (a)− r∗(a)τω = wia, (24)
The associated tax evasion is given simply by
r∗(a)− ω∗f (a) = a(1− τω − wi).
Since formal employers report zero profits r∗(a) = a, and make job offers by compensating workers
for the reservation wage wia and any applicable personal income tax τωr
∗(a) = τωa, the extent of tax
evasion is independent of the strength of tax enforcement, or the size of the minimum wage.
Meanwhile, the extent of minimum wage non-compliance is given by:
w¯(1− τω)− (ω∗f − r∗(a)τω) = w¯(1− τω)− wia.
Based on reasoning that should by now be familiar, since the participation constraint is binding,
employers make job offers that are just attractive enough to compensate workers for their forgone
reservation earning wia. It follows that the extent of minimum wage non-compliance is given by the
government mandated post tax take-home wage w¯(1− τω) and the reservation wage itself. Thus, the
strength of tax enforcement does not have any local impacts on minimum wage non-compliance.
Finally, the incidence of informality 1− α∗(a) is given by:
1− θ1/(1−β) (pi∗f (a)/cf)β/(1−β) ,
14The associated equilibrium likelihood of tax audit φ∗(a) = φ¯|r∗(a)−ω∗f (a)| = φ¯a(1− τω −wi) ∈ ((τpi − τω)/(2p¯(1−
τω)), 1/(2p¯)) lies in the interior of the [0, 1] interval for w¯ ∈ ((wia+ δ)/(1− τω), (wia+1/(2φ¯p¯))/(1− τω)) in this regime,
and p¯ ≥ 1.
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where
pi∗f (a) =
1
4p¯φ¯
− p¯φ¯( 1
2p¯φ¯
− a(1− τω − wi))2, (25)
At zero reported profit, actual profit pi∗f (a), and thus the incidence of informality, 1−α∗(a), are both
independent of the profit tax τpi. However, increases in the personal income tax raises actual wage
cost ω∗f , and decreases formal sector profits. Thus, the incidence of informality is strictly increasing
in the personal income tax rate. Strengthening tax enforcement similarly lowers formal sector profit,
and increases the incidence of informality.
Synthesizing our findings up to this point, Tables 4 and 5 display the tax evasion and minimum-
wage non-compliance responses to the four policy measures τpi, τω, w¯, and φ¯p¯. A number of features
are particularly striking. First, with the lone exception of the case where the personal income tax on
minimum wage workers is greater than the profit tax rate, which we have demonstrated in Table 3
to be the exception rather than the rule empirically, we find that employers over-report wage costs.
From the perspective of tax authorities, this over-reporting of wages manifests itself as tax evasion.
From the perspective of labor inspectors, this over-reporting of wages gives rise to minimum wage
non-compliance. However, tax evasion and minimum wage non-compliance made possible by less
than perfect enforcement raises expected formal employer profits. This puts checks on the incidence
of informality, in which employers pay no taxes at all, and the minimum wage legislation is neither
respect nor enforced.
Second, in both regimes II and III where the minimum wage is sufficiently high, or at an
intermediate range, we find that tax evasion and minimum wage non-compliance are synonymous.
Thus while the four policies have regime-specific impacts depending on which of two constraints
are binding and whether reported profit is positive, the effects of four policies on tax evasion, and
on minimum wage non-compliance are identical. In other words, there are well-defined regimes of
interest in which policies targeted towards mitigating tax evasion and minimum wage compliance can
be complementary to each other.
Third, it is clear from Tables 4 and 5 that a minimum wage hike can encourage tax evasion
(regime III), while raising the personal income tax can tame minimum wage non-compliance (regimes
I, III and IV). Similarly, strengthening tax enforcement can discourage tax evasion (regimes I and
II) and mitigate against minimum wage non-compliance (regime II). Thus, there are indeed cross-
cutting impacts that a minimum wage policy can have on tax evasion, and that tax policies can have
on minimum wage compliance.
This apparent plethora of possible comparative statics responses suggests that the devil is in
the details, and furthermore, that the nuanced responsiveness of tax evasion and minimum wage non-
compliance to policy changes is likely to depend on the precise specification of the penalty scheme,
23
the tax auditing technology, in addition to the height of the minimum wage, the two taxes, as well
as the strength of the tax enforcement regime. All of this make for a very fruitful agenda for future
research, and particularly on the design of an optimal penalty scheme. This said, our analysis so far
summarized in Tables 4 and 5 suggest a number of generalizations, and testable hypotheses:
Proposition 1 For all a ≥ δ/(1 − τω − wi) , and minimum wage w¯ < a, the extent of tax evasion
r∗ − ω∗f is
• weakly increasing in the profit tax rate τpi;
• weakly decreasing in the personal income tax rate τω;
• weakly increasing in the minimum wage w¯, and
• weakly decreasing in the strength of tax enforcement φ¯p¯.
The extent of minimum wage non-compliance is
• independent of the profit tax rate τpi;
• weakly decreasing in the personal income tax rate τω;
• weakly increasing in the minimum wage w¯, and
• weakly decreasing in the strength of tax enforcement φ¯p¯.
Table 6 summarizes responsiveness of the incidence of informality with respect to the four
policy measures. Contrary to Proposition 1, the effectiveness of the four policies are more uniform:
Proposition 2 For all minimum wage w¯ < a, the incidence of informality is weakly increasing in
the profit tax rate τpi, τω, and the minimum wage w¯, and strictly increasing in the strength of tax
enforcement φ¯p¯.
These results embody important policy implications, and some of these may not be apparent
at first sight. Consider, for example, the consequences of a flat tax reform, which equates τω and τpi.
15
Starting from an equilibrium with τω < τpi, a flat tax reform can be accomplished either by raising
τω, or by decreasing τpi. While our analysis of regime I suggest that closing the gap τpi − τω decreases
individual formal sector employer’s incentives to evade taxes, Proposition 2 suggests that the overall
tax consequences of a flat tax reform, accounting for the incidence of informality, will likely depend
critically on whether the proposed flat tax requires an increase in τω – which is expected to entice
employers to turn to the informal sector, or a reduction in τpi – which will have the exact opposite
impact.
15We follow convention and refer a flat tax reform to a policy of constant marginal tax rate.
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4 Optimal Policies for Poverty Alleviation
A key departure of this model from the existing literature is in its unique ability to identify and
distinguish between two wage distributions that prevail among workers of differing skills. First, the
reported wage distribution pertains to the wage distribution that can be ascertained from firm level
tax records for example. Second, the actual wage distribution pertains to the true take home income
of working individuals that may be ascertained from household / labor force surveys for example.
Our objective in this section is to evaluate the effectiveness of policies in alleviating poverty,
evaluated based on the actual, rather than the reported post tax take home wage of individual workers.
To do so, we first combine Figures 1a - 1c to yield Figure 2, which summarizes in one diagram the
juxtaposition of the four regimes (I - IV) examined so far. To recall,
• in regime I, the reported wage exceeds the minimum wage, formal worker are paid their reser-
vation income post tax, and employers report positive profits;
• in regime II, the reported wage is equal to the minimum wage, formal workers are paid strictly
higher than their reservation income post tax, and employers report positive profits;
• in regime III, the reported wage is equal to the minimum wage, formal workers are paid their
reservation income post tax, and employers report positive profits;
• in regime IV, the reported wage exceeds the minimum wage, formal workers are paid their
reservation income post tax, and employers report zero profit.
We begin with a preliminary result, which can be verified simply by inspection of Figure 2:
Proposition 3 I. For all a > w¯ and tax enforcement sufficiently strict (φ¯p¯ sufficiently large) such
that
a >
1
2φ¯p¯(1− τω − wi)
,
the post-tax take home earnings of formal sector workers strictly exceed their reservation benchmark
wia if and only if the minimum wage exceeds the threshold:
w¯ ≥ wia+ 1/(2φ¯p¯)
1− τω − wi .
The stricter the tax enforcement regime, and thus the higher φ¯p¯ is, the lower this threshold will be.
II. For all a > w¯ and tax enforcement sufficiently lax, however, with
a <
1
(2φ¯p¯(1− τω − wi)
,
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there does not exist a minimum wage w¯ < a that can raise the actual post-tax income of formal sector
workers beyond the reservation benchmark wia.
When tax enforcement is strict enough, the threshold minimum wage is given simply by the MW
schedule in Figure 2, which separates (a, w¯) in regime II from that of I, III and IV. As noted earlier
in our discussion of the employer’s decision problem in regime II, what is particularly notable here is
that a minimum wage is shown to raise the income of formal sector workers even though an official
minimum wage enforcement mechanism is non-existent. Rather, enforcement against tax evasion
serves as the implicit discipline device, and prevents formal employers from over-stating their wage
cost by too much, or equivalently, enforcement against tax evasion effectively discourages formal
employers from paying workers too low a wage relative to the reported minimum wage w¯.
Now, the vertical dotted line at 1
2φ¯p¯(1−τω−wi) in Figure 2 divides the range of possible workers’
skill levels into two regions separated by a critical skill level a¯ = 1
2φ¯p¯(1−τω−wi) . To the right of a¯
and hence for workers with relatively high skills given the tax enforcement regime, a minimum wage
which raises the post-tax take home earnings of formal sector workers beyond wia can always be
found for region II is non-empty for a ≥ 1
2φ¯p¯(1−τω−wi) . However, to the left of a¯ and hence for workers
with sufficiently low skills given the tax enforcement regime, there does not exist a minimum wage,
however high or low, that raises the post tax take home income of formal sector workers beyond
the reservation level, since the set of (a, w¯) in region II with a < a¯ is empty. Strengthening tax
enforcement through an increase in φ¯p¯ shifts this critical skill level a¯ to the left, accommodating more
formal workers whose income can be raised beyond wia via an appropriately set minimum wage.
In what follows, we examine the choice of a minimum wage and tax policy package {w¯, τpi, τω}
for each skill level that minimizes poverty among workers of a given skill level a, taking as given the
strength of the tax enforcement measures φ¯p¯ in place. To this end, let z > 0 denote the poverty
line. Consider all skill levels such that the benchmark reservation income is less than the poverty line
wia < z, or
a > z/wi ≡ az.
In the absence of poverty intervention through a minimum wage for example, all workers with a < az
are poor, while those with a ≥ az are not. We consider the policy problem:
min
w¯,τpi ,τω
1− α∗(a), s.t. ω∗f (a)− r∗(a)τω ≥ z,
for a < az. The objective of the policy maker is thus to minimize the incidence of informality, while
at the same time guaranteeing formal sector workers an income level no less than the poverty line.
Since a < az, all informal workers are by definition poor. Stated differently, the objective of the
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policy maker is to minimize the poverty head count, when formal sector workers are guaranteed an
income level no less than the poverty line.
From Proposition 3, we know that in order to strictly raise the income of formal sector workers
above the reservation level wia, what is required is a minimum wage that is sufficiently high, as well
as a tax enforcement mechanism in place that is sufficiently strict, so that regime II applies. There
are thus two distinctive possibilities:
1. if tax enforcement is sufficiently lax such that
az ≤ 1
2φ¯p¯(1− τω − wi)
,
it follows from Proposition 3 that there does not exist a minimum wage w¯ < a that can lift any
worker with a < az out of poverty since regime II is empty;
2. if tax enforcement is strict enough so that
az >
1
2φ¯p¯(1− τω − wi)
,
there are thus two types of workers who will live under the poverty line in the absence of policy
intervention. Those with relatively low skills a < 1
2φ¯p¯(1−τω−wi) for whom regime II is empty,
and those with relatively high skills a ∈ [ 1
2φ¯p¯(1−τω−wi) , az], for whom regime II is non-empty.
For the former group of lower skill workers, a minimum wage that lifts workers out of poverty
continues to be non-existent.
Suppose therefore that az >
1
2φ¯p¯(1−τω−wi) . Let us consider the group of workers with relatively
high skills, a > [ 1
2φ¯p¯(1−τω−wi) , az], who would otherwise be living under the poverty line in the absence
of policy intervention. From Proposition 3, any minimum wage w¯ < a but greater than the threshold
demarcated by the MW schedule in Figure 2, wia+1/(2φ¯p¯)1−τω−wi , raises the post-tax take home income of
formal sector workers beyond wia. From (19), the corresponding post tax take home wage is given
by the government mandated post-tax take home wage w¯(1 − τω), net of the extent of wage under-
reporting, 1/(2φ¯p¯) in this regime, or ω∗f (a)−r∗(a)τω = w¯(1−τω)−1/(2p¯φ¯). The higher the minimum
wage, the higher will be the take home wage of formal sector workers in this regime. It follows that
if the post-tax take home wage is to exceed the poverty line, the minimum wage will need to be
sufficiently high, since
ω∗f (a)− r∗(a)τω ≥ z ⇔ w¯ ≥
z + 1/(2φ¯p¯)
1− τω ≡ w¯(z). (26)
(26) above shows that the smallest minimum wage w¯(z) that lifts formal sector workers out of poverty
is decreasing in the strength of the tax enforcement regime, and increasing in the personal income
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tax. Such a wage is feasible, in the sense that it does not exceed the net output a of a worker if and
only if
w¯(z) =
z + 1/(2φ¯p¯)
1− τω < a.
It follows that for all workers in the range a < w¯(z), a minimum wage w¯ < a that lifts workers out
of poverty does not exist. Otherwise, for workers in the range a ∈ [w¯(z), az], setting w¯ = w¯(z) puts
formal sector workers exactly at the poverty line.
Now, turning to the minimization of poverty head count, which requires minimizing the inci-
dence of informality subject to (26) above, recall from (6) and (21) that the incidence of informality
in regime II is given by:
1− θ1/(1−β) ([(1− τpi)(a− w¯) + 1/(4φ¯p¯)]/cf)β/(1−β) .
Clearly, the higher the minimum wage, the higher will be the incidence of informality implying that
the constraint in (25) must be strictly binding. Substituting w¯(z) into the equation above, it is
straightforward to see that the incidence of informality is furthermore strictly increasing in τpi as well
as τω. We have thus:
Proposition 4 I. If tax enforcement is sufficiently lax, so that az ≤ 1/(2φ¯p¯(1− τω−wi)), there does
not exist a poverty alleviating minimum wage for all a < az.
II. If tax enforcement is sufficiently strict, so that az > 1/(2φ¯p¯(1 − τω − wi)), a poverty alleviating
minimum wage does not exist for low skilled workers with a < w¯(z) ≡ z+1/(2φ¯p¯)1−τω . For higher skilled
workers, with a ∈ [w¯(z), az], setting
w¯ = z +
1
2p¯φ¯
, τpi = 0, τω = 0
minimizes the poverty head count.
To verify the final item noted in Proposition 4, suppose that the minimum wage is set below z + 1
2p¯φ¯
as indicated in the proposition. It follows from (26) that formal sector workers live below the poverty
line. Since all informal sector workers live below the poverty line as well for a < az, a minimum wage
policy w¯ that stipulates w¯ < z + 1
2p¯φ¯
is completely ineffective in alleviating poverty.
Now suppose instead that the minimum wage is set above or equal to z + 1
2p¯φ¯
. It follows from
(26) that all formal sector workers live at or above the poverty line, but all informal sector workers
remain poor. To minimize the incidence of poverty, the policy maker should set w¯ exactly at w¯(z)
and τpi = τω = 0, since the incidence of informality decreases with w¯, τpi and τω.
Importantly, Proposition 3 demonstrates that a poverty minimizing minimum wage is set at
the poverty line z, plus an additional expression that depends only on the strength of tax enforcement
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φ¯p¯. This remarkably simple formula is independent of the productivity of the worker, or the informal
sector wage. What Proposition 3 also points out is that this such an optimal minimum wage can
be effective even when the minimum wage itself is not enforced, but that a sufficiently strict tax
enforcement regime is in place.
5 Optimal Policies for Tax Compliance
We focus now on evaluating the policy package {w¯, τpi, τω} that maximizes total expected government
revenue, including all tax revenue on profits and wage earnings, as well as any applicable fines and
penalties collected, taking once again as given the strength of the tax enforcement regime in place.
Since informal employers and workers do not pay taxes, total government tax revenue G(a)
is given simply by the sum of per employer tax on formal profits τpi min{0, a − r∗(a)}, tax on wage
earnings τωr
∗(a), and the expected fines and penalties collected: φ¯p¯(r∗(a) − ω∗f (a))2, multiplied by
the total number of formal sector employers, α∗(a)N(a). From (14), and by definition of pi∗f (a),
G(a) = N(a)θ1/(1−β)
(
pi∗f (a)
cf
)β/(1−β) (
τpi min{0, a− r∗(a)}+ τωr∗(a) + φ¯p¯(r∗(a)− ω∗f (a))2
)
= N(a)θ1/(1−β)
(
pi∗f (a)
cf
)β/(1−β) (
a− ω∗f (a) + τωr∗(a)− pi∗f (a)
)
(27)
Intuitively, the true pre-tax profit (a − ω∗f (a) + τωr∗(a)) net of the post-tax post-penalty profit per
employer pi∗f (a) gives the total tax take per employer.
Using the results in section 3.1, government revenue can be evaluated at (a, w¯) combinations
consistent with regimes I - IV. Suppose to begin with that the minimum wage is sufficiently high, as
in regime II, so that the participation constraint is not binding. From (19), the post-tax take home
wage of a formally employed worker is ω∗f (a) − τωr∗(a) = w¯(1 − τω) − 1/(2p¯φ¯), while formal sector
expected profit pi∗f (a) as displayed in (21), has been shown to be strictly decreasing in the minimum
wage w¯. Substituting these expressions into (27) above, we obtain:
G(a) = N(a)θ1/(1−β)
(
pi∗f (a)
cf
)β/(1−β)(
aτpi − w¯(τpi − τω) + 1
4p¯φ¯
)
It follows by inspection that since τpi ≥ τω, total government revenue G(a) is strictly decreasing
in w¯ for all (a, w¯) combinations in regime II. Put differently, any tax, and minimum wage policy
combinations that put an employer in the interior of regime II can be ruled out from the set of
government revenue maximizing policy. This is in sharp contrast to the set of poverty alleviating tax
policies, which we have just shown to necessarily put employers in regime II (Proposition 4).
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Next, consider instead relatively low minimum wages such that regimes I, III or IV apply,
wherein the participation constraint is strictly binding, or, ω∗f (a)− τωr∗(a) = wia, and formal sector
expected profits pi∗f (a) are displayed in (16), (23), and (25) respectively for regimes I, III, and IV.
Thus:
G(a) = N(a)θ1/(1−β)
(
pi∗f (a)
cf
)β/(1−β) (
a(1− wi)− pi∗f (a)
)
Observe that changes in formal employer profits impact government revenue in two distinctive, and
opposite directions. First, raising pi∗f (a) decreases the incidence of informality through α
∗(a) =
θ1/(1−β)
(
pi∗f (a)
cf
)β/(1−β)
. Second, and going in opposite direction, a higher pi∗f (a) necessarily requires
lowering the government revenue per employer a(1 − wi) − pi∗f (a). On balance, total government
revenue is maximized by choice of pi∗f (a) satisfying:
pi∗f (a) = βa(1− wi)
so that profit per formal employer is a fraction β of the profit per formal employer in the absence of
any taxes or minimum wage a(1−wi). One way to exactly achieve this level of profit is summarized
in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 A flat tax reform at minimal minimum wage protection maximizes government rev-
enue G(a). This is accomplished by setting
w¯ = 0, τpi = τω = (1− β)(1− wi).
A zero minimum wage (regime I, or IV) reflects the government’s desire to raise revenue, rather than
to alleviate poverty. Next, by removing the tax gap, and thus by setting δ = 0, regime IV (where
a < δ/(1 − τω − wi) = 0) vanishes, and as such all formal employers of workers with a > 0 report
positive profits. With regime I remaining, setting δ = 0 also removes any incentives on the part of
formal employers to evade taxes evaluated at w¯ = 0 since r∗(a)− ω∗f (a) = δ from (15) for regime I.
To balance the role of the uniform tax rate τpi = τω on tax revenue per formal employer, and
the incidence of informality, the optimal tax rate is set at (1− β)(1−wi) with two considerations in
mind.16 First, the higher the elasticity of employer entry on job creation β = d log Φ(a)/d logM(a),
the lower the tax rate will be. Meanwhile, the higher the productivity of informal sector workers
relative to formal sector workers wi, the lower the tax rate should be.
16It can also be verified that evaluated at this optimal tax rate (1− β)(1− wi), the post-tax net output of a formal
sector worker exceeds that of an informal sector worker, consistent with our assumption that 1−τω−wi > 0 throughout
this paper.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the impacts of tax and minimum wage reforms on the incidence of informality,
as measured by the extent of minimum wage non-compliance, the extent of tax evasion, and the size
of the informal workforce. These measures are based on two distinctive perspectives on informality,
associated with labor standard compliance, and tax compliance. The model we propose offers a list
of empirically relevant observations and testable hypotheses, featuring (i) the endogenous distinction
between firm-level reported wage distribution and actual wage distribution, (ii) the complementarity
of tax enforcement on minimum wage enforcement, (iii) the impact that minimum wage reform has
on tax and minimum wage compliance, and (iv) the impact that tax policy reform has on tax and
minimum wage compliance.
The paper concludes with a look at the design of optimal minimum wage and tax policies, given
the objectives of tax revenue minimization, and poverty alleviation among workers. For example,
we provide conditions under which a tax reform is consistent with the objective of tax revenue
minimization. At the same time, we also offer an optimal minimum wage and tax policy formula
consistent with the objective of poverty alleviation. In each case, we highlight the role of the strength
of the tax enforcement regime on the optimal tax and minimum wage policy formula.
This paper is a first attempt at analyzing the role of minimum wage and tax policy reforms
jointly on minimum wage and tax compliance. Many possible routes for future research remain.
For example, while we highlight the role of tax enforcement in this paper, ample opportunities for
extension of the basic framework by introducing a combination of tax and minimum wage enforcement
remain. In addition, in the tradition of the theory of tax enforcement, the risk attitudes of the
employers naturally matter. The introduction of risk aversion, for example, into our basic model is
a promising avenue for future work. Finally, in our optimal policy formulation, we have taken the
strength of tax enforcement and minimum wage enforcement as given. An extension of the model
to allow for endogenous tax and minimum wage enforcement regimes will also be of real interest in
efforts to better understand the various nuances of tax and minimum wage policies on informality.
Appendix A
In this appendix, we verify that for any (ωf , r) pair such that neither of the two constraints bind, ωf > wia+τωr
and r > w¯, an alternative pairing (ω′f , r
′) satisfying the a binding participation can be found that raises expected
profit, a− ωf − τpi(a− r)− φ¯p¯(r − ωf )2 < a− ωf − τpi(a− r′)− φ¯p¯(r′ − ω′f )2.
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To see this, note that by adding and subtracting (τpi − τω)(r − ωf )/(1− τω) and rearranging terms,
a− ωf − τpi(a− r)− φ¯p¯(r − ωf )2 = 1− τpi
1− τω (a(1− τo)− ωf + rτω) + φ¯p¯
(
τpi − τω
2φ¯p¯(1− τω)
)2
−φ¯p¯
(
τpi − τω
2φ¯p¯(1− τω)
− (r − ωf )
)2
≤ 1− τpi
1− τω (a(1− τω)− ωf + rτω)
<
1− τpi
1− τω (a(1− τω − wi))
= a− ω′f − τpi(a− r)− φ¯p¯(r′ − ω′f )2
where ω′f = wia+ r
′τω from (I), r′ = wia+δ1−τω , and δ = (τpi − τω)/(2φ¯p¯(1− τω)).
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Table 1: Informality, Labor Standards Compliance
Country Alternative Measures of Informality
I. Share of workers not II. Share of workers III. Non-coverage by
covered by social without an social protection
security contributions employment contract
2007 2008 2006 1995-99 2000-07
Algeria 42.7 41.3
Argentina 53.3 −
Austria 35.4 34.5 10
Belgium 38.8 36.2 7
Bolivia 63.5 −
Brazil 60 51.1
Chad 95.2 −
Chile 35.8 −
Colombia 38.4 −
Costa Rica 44.3 −
Czech Republic 40.8 40.4 2
Denmark 12
Dominican Republic 47.6 −
Ecuador 53.5 −
Egypt, Arab Rep. 55.2 45.9
El Salvador 56.6 −
Estonia 34.6 33.9 5
Finland 23.0 23.5 1
France 51.9 − 8
Germany 4
Greece 37.1 37.3 39
Guinea 86.7 −
Haiti 92.6 −
Honduras 58.2 −
Hungary 40.6 42.4 4
Iceland 13.4 13.3 26
India 83.4 −
Indonesia 77.9 −
Ireland 39.8 40.3 39
Israel 38
Italy 40.0 39.3
Iran − 48.8
Kenya 71.6 −
Kyrgyz Republic − 44.4
Lebanon − 51.8
Luxembourg 34.6 32.6 6
Mali 94.1 81.8
Mexico 59.4 50.1
Moldova − 21.5
Morocco 44.8 67.1
Netherlands 17.7 21.6 9
Norway 12.2 13.2 11
Pakistan 64.6 −
Panama 37.6 49.4
Paraguay 65.5 −
Peru − 67.9
Philippines 72 −
Poland 65.3 57.0 6
Portugal 35.1 38.5 15
Romania 5.4 22
Russian Federation 7 − 8.6
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Table 1: Informality, Labor Standards Compliance
Country Alternative Measures of Informality
I. Share of workers not II. Share of workers III. Non-coverage by
covered by social without an social protection
security contributions employment contract
2007 2008 2006 1995-99 2000-07
Slovak Republic 39.1 38.5 3
Slovenia 24.7 25.2 11
South Africa − 50.6
Spain 41.5 41.4 10
Sweden 22.7 22.0 2
Switzerland 5
Syrian Arab Republic 42.9 30.7
Thailand 51.5 −
Turkey 44 30.9 33.2
Tunisia 47.1 35
United Kingdom 22
Venezuela, R.B. 46.9 49.4
West Bank and Gaza − 43.4
Yemen, Rep. − 51.1
1 Measure (I) is based on EU-SILC 2007 and 2008, re-produced from Schneider (2011), measure (II) is
based on the European Social Survey 2008, re-produced from Schneider (2011) and measure (III) is
taken from OECD (2009) tabulations from national labor force surveys where informality is defined
as non-coverage by social protection.
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Table 2: Informality, Enterprise Surveys
Country (Year) Alternative Measures of Informality
I. % of firms II. % of firms III. % of firms IV. Number of years
which report competing with registered when firm operated
too few sales unregistered/informal starting without
firms operations registration
Afghanistan (2008) − 45.88 88.01 1.8
Albania (2007) − 52.56 89.35 0.26
Algeria (2007) − 66.84 98.32 0.04
Angola (2010) − 41.25 62.65 1.12
Argentina (2010) − 68.2 92.35 0.87
Armenia (2009) − 44.57 96.23 0.14
Azerbaijan (2009) − 40.71 85.12 4.73
Bangladesh (2007) − 46.62 − −
Belarus (2008) − 50.43 98.48 2.9
Benin (2009) − 77.25 87.93 0.55
Bhutan (2009) − 19.92 99.05 0.08
Bolivia (2010) − 80.51 72.43 4.25
Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009) − 46.48 98.6 0.16
Botswana (2010) − 54.64 93.94 0.16
Brazil (2009) − 55.02 95.78 0.48
Bulgaria (2009) − 54.11 98.48 0.08
Burkina Faso (2009) 26.45 74.95 77.74 1.01
Burundi (2006) 42.73 60.3 − −
Cambodia (2007) 78.11 − 87.45 0.69
Cameroon (2009) 70.38 90.11 82.06 0.63
Cape Verde (2009) − 44.54 81.25 1.96
Chad (2009) − 89.8 77.13 1.23
Chile (2010) − 55.84 96.05 0.2
China (2003) 49.45 − − −
Colombia (2010) − 70.93 94.27 0.47
Congo, Dem. Rep. (2010) − 89.96 61.86 1.87
Congo, Rep. (2009) 90.02 69.65 84.28 0.27
Costa Rica (2010) − 70.36 80.84 1.04
Cte d’Ivoire (2009) 68.06 73.6 56.37 0.48
Croatia (2007) − 31.66 98.07 0.03
Czech Republic (2009) − 42.87 98.04 0.08
Dominican Republic (2005) 73.63 − − −
Ecuador (2010) − 65.72 85.1 0.65
Egypt, Arab Rep. (2008) 30 46.68 − −
El Salvador (2010) − 65.24 75.67 1.1
Eritrea (2009) − 28.16 100 0
Estonia (2009) − 26.32 97.39 0.06
Ethiopia (2006) 51.6 − − −
Fiji (2009) − 39.6 93.48 1.15
Gabon (2009) 64.83 75.96 63.73 0.73
Gambia, the (2006) 88.05 60.34 − −
Georgia (2008) − 52.23 99.55 0.42
Germany (2005) − − − −
Ghana (2007) 59.2 69.13 66.44 2.17
Greece (2005) 53.19 − − −
Guatemala (2010) − 69.84 89.98 0.59
Guinea (2006) 95.37 62.8 − −
Guinea-Bissau (2006) 68.19 53.7 − −
Guyana, CR (2004) 74.36 − − −
Honduras (2010) − 63.17 81.29 0.86
Hungary (2009) − 49 100 0
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Table 2: Informality, Enterprise Surveys
Country (Year) Alternative Measures of Informality
I. % of firms II. % of firms III. % of firms IV. Number of years
which report competing with registered when firm operated
too few sales unregistered/informal starting without
firms operations registration
India (2006) 59.24 − − −
Indonesia (2009) − 65.09 29.1 2.43
Ireland (2005) 28.78 − − −
Jamaica (2005) 28.77 − − −
Jordan (2006) 12.95 − − −
Kazakhstan (2009) − 36.89 97.37 0.04
Kenya (2007) 60.54 − − −
Korea, Rep. (2005) 43.65 − − −
Kosovo (2009) − 64.07 89.23 0.23
Kyrgyz Republic (2009) − 67.46 95.94 4.3
Lao PDR (2009) − 12.82 93.53 0.17
Latvia (2009) − 41.67 98.49 0.12
Lebanon (2009) 34.98 − 97.63 0.28
Lesotho (2009) − 59.6 86.8 0.63
Liberia (2009) 97.32 66.21 73.81 0.63
Lithuania (2009) − 50.11 97.1 0.25
Macedonia, FYR (2009) − 73.89 99.24 0.01
Madagascar (2009) 35.61 62.29 97.45 0.09
Malawi (2009) − 77.84 78.58 0.57
Malaysia (2007) − − 52.97 0
Mali (2010) − 75.38 79.22 0.51
Mauritania (2006) 82.5 65.16 − −
Mauritius (2009) 36.25 50.95 84.17 1.54
Mexico (2006) 57.65 69.67 94.08 0.1
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. (2009) − 41.11 96.87 0.16
Moldova (2009) − 46.46 97.86 0.11
Mongolia (2009) − 43.04 90.11 2.49
Montenegro (2009) − 27.26 95.47 0.21
Morocco (2007) − 47.68 86.02 0.21
Mozambique (2007) 73.1 75.45 85.86 0.6
Namibia (2006) 45.48 33.09 − −
Nepal (2009) − 49.37 93.96 0.33
Nicaragua (2010) − 62.61 74.03 2.02
Niger (2009) − 85.98 90.51 0.54
Nigeria (2007) 68 60.07 − −
Oman (2003) 42.46 − − −
Pakistan (2007) 7.57 12.45 − −
Panama (2010) − 51.4 99.74 0.01
Paraguay (2010) − 75.28 98.71 0.25
Peru (2010) − 68.59 82.63 0.73
Philippines (2009) − 37.52 97.53 0.53
Poland (2009) − 32.73 99.25 0.02
Portugal (2005) 37.25 − − −
Romania (2009) − 35.14 98.71 0.11
Russian Federation (2009) − 32.23 94.68 0.77
Rwanda (2006) 28.9 47.07 − −
Samoa (2009) − 63.56 88.36 0.58
Senegal (2007) 21.63 74.11 78.86 0.95
Serbia (2009) − 53.62 95.02 0.19
Sierra Leone (2009) 81.92 80.34 89.22 0.86
Slovak Republic (2009) − 40.34 100 0
Slovenia (2009) − 27.44 99.85 0.01
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Table 2: Informality, Enterprise Surveys
Country (Year) Alternative Measures of Informality
I. % of firms II. % of firms III. % of firms IV. Number of years
which report competing with registered when firm operated
too few sales unregistered/informal starting without
firms operations registration
South Africa (2007) 40.3 45.32 91.03 0.26
Spain (2005) 18.33 − − −
Sri Lanka (2004) 41.97 − − −
Swaziland (2006) 74.57 39.72 − −
Syrian Arab Republic (2009) 57.06 52.57 − −
Tajikistan (2008) − 35.31 92.74 6.78
Tanzania (2006) 71.03 66.85 − −
Thailand (2006) − − − −
Timor-Leste (2009) − 66.4 91.79 0.67
Togo (2009) − 80.49 75.82 1.15
Tonga (2009) − 86.77 93.54 0.25
Turkey (2008) − 52.36 94.05 0.42
Uganda (2006) 74.49 73.11 − −
Ukraine (2008) − 48.48 95.76 0.92
Uruguay (2010) − 67.66 94.61 0.64
Uzbekistan (2008) − 39.17 100 4.09
Vanuatu (2009) − 39.91 88.06 1.26
Venezuela, R.B. (2010) − 29.76 95.61 0.13
Vietnam (2009) − 55.56 87.46 1.38
West Bank and Gaza (2006) 25.68 − − −
Yemen, Rep. (2010) 82.33 37.16 81.69 0.82
Zambia (2007) − 73.84 96.18 0.23
1 The four measures give the degree of informality among businesses in 125 countries. The
table is re-produced from results based on surveys of more than 120,000 firms by the
World Bank (Enterprise Surveys, http://www.enterprisesurveys.org, methodology available from
https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology/).
2 Measure (I) is constructed from the percentage of firms expressing that a typical firm reports less than 100 percent
of sales for tax purposes, measure (II) is constructed from the percentage of firms competing against unregistered
or informal firms (Question: Does this establishment compete against unregistered or informal firms?), measure
(III) is constructed from the percentage of firms formally registered when they started operations in the country
(Question: Was this establishment formally registered when it began operations?) and measure (IV) is constructed
from the average number of years firms operated without formal registration, computed only for the firms not
formally registered when starting operations (Question: In what year did this establishment begin operations?
Question: Was this establishment formally registered when it began operations? Question: In what year was this
establishment formally registered?).
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Table 3: Taxation
Country I. Tax rate on II. Tax rate on
Profit, τpi Personal Income, τω
Albania 40.6 0
Angola 53.2 0
Antigua and Bermuda 41.5 0
Argentina 108.2 9
Armenia 40.7 10
Australia 47.9 0
Austria 55.5 0
Azerbaijan 40.9 14
Belarus 80.4 12
Belgium 57 25
Bolivia 80 13
Bosnia and Herzegovina 23 10
Botswana 19.5 0
Brazil 69 0
Bulgaria 29 10
Cambodia 22.5 0
Cameroon 49.1 11
Canada 29.2 15
Chile 25 0
China 63.5 5
Colombia 78.7 0
Congo, Dem. Rep. 339.7 3
Congo, Rep. 65.5 1
Costa Rica 55 0
Croatia 32.5 12
Cyprus 23.2 0
Czech Republic 48.8 15
Denmark 29.2 37
Dominican Republic 40.7 0
Ecuador 35.3 0
Egypt, Arab Rep. 42.6 0
El Salvador 35 0
Equatorial Guinea 59.5 0
Estonia 49.6 21
Fiji 39.3 0
Finland 44.6 6.5
France 65.8 0
Gabon 43.5 0
Georgia 15.3 20
Germany 48.2 0
Ghana 32.7 0
Greece 47.2 0
Guatemala 40.9 15
Honduras 48.3 0
Hong Kong SAR, China 24.1 2
Hungary 53.3 16
India 63.3 0
Indonesia 37.3 5
Iraq 28.4 3
Israel 31.7 10
Italy 68.6 23
Jamaica 50.1 0
Japan 48.6 5
Jordan 31.2 7
Kazakhstan 29.6 10
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Table 3: Taxation
Country I. Tax rate on II. Tax rate on
Profit, τpi Personal Income, τω
Kenya 49.7 10
Korea, Rep. 29.8 6
Kyrgyz Republic 57.2 10
Lao PDR 33.7 0
Latvia 38.5 25
Lebanon 30.2 2
Lithuania 38.7 0
Luxembourg 21.1 0
Macedonia, FYR 10.6 10
Madagascar 37.7 0
Malawi 25.1 0
Malaysia 33.7 0
Mauritius 24.1 15
Mexico 50.5 1.92
Moldova 30.9 7
Mongolia 23 10
Montenegro 26.6 9
Morocco 41.7 0
Mozambique 34.3 10
Namibia 9.6 0
Netherlands 40.5 33
New Zealand 34.3 10.5
Nicaragua 63.2 0
Nigeria 32.2 5
Norway 41.6 0
Oman 21.6 0
Pakistan 31.6 0.75
Panama 50.1 0
Papua New Guinea 42.3 22
Paraguay 35 8
Peru 40.2 0
Philippines 45.8 5
Poland 42.3 18
Portugal 43.3 11.5
Puerto Rico 67.7 0
Romania 44.9 16
Russian Federation 46.5 13
Saudi Arabia 14.5 0
Senegal 46 0
Serbia 34 10
Singapore 25.4 0
Slovak Republic 48.7 19
Slovenia 35.4 16
South Africa 30.5 18
Spain 56.5 24
Sri Lanka 64.7 4
St. Kitts and Nevis 52.7 0
Swaziland 36.8 20
Sweden 54.6 31
Switzerland 30.1 0
Syrian Arab Republic 42.9 5
Tajikistan 86 8
Tanzania 45.2 0
Thailand 37.4 0
Turkey 44.5 15
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Table 3: Taxation
Country I. Tax rate on II. Tax rate on
Profit, τpi Personal Income, τω
Uganda 35.7 0
Ukraine 55.5 15
United Arab Emirates 14.1 0
United Kingdom 37.3 20
United States 46.8 10
Uruguay 42 0
Uzbekistan 95.6 10
Venezuela, RB 52.6 6
Vietnam 33.1 5
Zimbabwe 40.3 3
1 Tax rate on profit, τpi, measures the amount of taxes and mandatory contributions payable
by businesses after accounting for allowable deductions and exemptions as a share of
commercial profits. Taxes withheld (such as personal income tax) or collected and re-
mitted to tax authorities (such as value added taxes, sales taxes or goods and service
taxes) are excluded. This variable is taken from the World Bank, Doing Business project
(http://www.doingbusiness.org/), 2010 figures.
2 Tax rate on personal income, τω, is the lowest tax on personal income taken from Pricewater-
houseCoopers International Limited (PwCIL), Worldwide Tax Summaries, current estimates
(August 2011).
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Table 4: The Determinants of Tax Evasion |r∗(a)− ω∗f (a)| in the Four Regimes, assuming τpi > τω.
I II III IV
δ = (τpi − τω)/(2φ¯p¯(1− τω)) 1/(2φ¯p¯) w¯(1− τω)− wia a(1− τω − wi)
τpi + 0 0 0
τω - 0 - -
w¯ 0 0 + 0
φ¯p¯ - - 0 0
Table 5: The Determinants of Minimum Wage Non-Compliance w¯(1− τω)− [ω∗f (a)− τωr∗(a)] in the
Four Regimes.
I II III IV
w¯(1− τω)− wia 1/(2φ¯p¯) w¯(1− τω)− wia w¯(1− τω)− wia
τpi 0 0 0 0
τω - 0 - -
w¯ + 0 + 0
φ¯p¯ 0 - 0 0
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Table 6: The Determinants of the Incidence of Informality 1− α∗(a) in the Four Regimes.
I II III IV
τpi + + + 0
τω + 0 + +
w¯ 0 + + 0
φ¯p¯ + + + +
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